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TORTS-Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.
Suit Against Used Car Dealer Based Upon Strict
Liability in Tort Dismissed For Failure to State a
Cause of Action
On September 3, 1971, Maradean and Mark Peterson were walking home from school when they were struck by an automobile
whose brakes had failed. Maradean died, and Mark was severely
injured. James A. Peterson, their father, as administrator of Maradean's estate, and Mark Peterson, through his father as next friend,
brought suit against Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., the seller of the
used 1965 automobile involved in the accident. The complaint' alleged that the automobile had not been in reasonably safe condition
due to certain defects in the braking system,' that these defects
existed at the time of the automobile's resale and transfer to the
purchaser, and that the existence of these defects was the direct and
proximate cause of the death and injuries which gave rise to the
initiation of the suit.
The Circuit Court of Winnebago County granted the defendant's
motion to strike on the grounds that the doctrine of strict liability
does not apply to the sale of a used product.' The Appellate Court
for the Second District disagreed, holding that the doctrine does
apply to used car dealers on public policy grounds.' However, on
appeal the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated the circuit court's judgment.'
The supreme court reasoned that imposition of strict liability
would, in effect, make the defendant an insurer of his automobiles,
a result which the court viewed as unwarranted. Yet the court not
only left the door open to future strict liability actions against used
car dealers, but also made pronouncements affecting the law in such
areas as bystander recovery, indemnity, lessor liability, and suits for
breach of warranty. Thus the Peterson decision could have profound
ramifications, both for the used car industry and for the develop1. Counts XIII and XIV. See Abstract of Record at 2-6.
2. The complaint, in pertinent part, alleged that the braking system had been defective
in three particulars: (a) a spring or springs in the left front wheel braking system was missing
at the time of sale; (b) one of the left rear brake shoes was completely worn out at the time
of the sale; (c) a part of the cylinder braking system in the left rear wheel was missing at the
time of sale. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6.
3. Abstract of Record at 8.
4. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 307 N.E.2d 729 (1974).
The defendant was erroneously designated as "Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co." in the published
opinion of the court.
5. 61 111. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
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ment of products liability law in Illinois. This article will explore
those ramifications.
STRICT LIABILITY IN ILLINOIS-A BRIEF SURVEY

While foreshadowed by earlier decisions recognizing the right of
one not in privity with a manufacturer to sue for injuries arising
from a defective product,' the doctrine of strict liability in tort did
not receive judicial acceptance7 until the decision of the California
Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. I In that
case it was established that a mahufacturer may be held strictly
liable in tort when he places an article on the market with the
knowledge that no inspection will be made prior to use and the
article contains a defect which causes injury.' The court declared
that liability was imposed by law as a matter of policy and thus was
not governed by the law of contracts, stressing that its purpose was
to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves.10
The doctrine of strict liability in tort was given formal expression
by the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Section 402A
imposes strict liability upon the seller of any defective product so
long as three conditions are met: first, the defect must render the
product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer of the
product; second, the seller must be engaged in the business of selling
such a product; and third, the product, which is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold, must cause physical harm to the user
6. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
7. But see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
8. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
9. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
10. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
11. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For further commentary on the history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment b (1965); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and
Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. Rav. 30 (1965); James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv.
44 (1955); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Assault Upon the Citadel]; Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Fall of the Citadel]; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Wade]. For a background to and understanding of section 402A, see
Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22
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or consumer or to his property. In comment c, the drafters articulate
the reasons for the doctrine:
On whatever theory, the justification for .
strict liability has
been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use
and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be
injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in
the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that
the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford
it are those who market the products.
The doctrine was adopted in Illinois in 1965 with the landmark
decision of Suvada v. White Motor Co.'3 In Suvada, the plaintiffs
purchased a used tractor unit from the White Motor Company. Four
months later, the brakes on the tractor failed, causing it to collide
with a bus. After settling damage and personal injury claims, the
plaintiffs brought an indemnity action against White, the seller and
installer of the brakes, and Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air
Brake Company, the manufacturer of the brakes. The appellate
court held that the plaintiffs had stated causes of action in all the
counts pleaded. 4
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed,' 5 holding that Bendix
could be held strictly liable in tort because of its status as the
manufacturer of a defective product. Since its liability was in tort,
lack of privity did not defeat the plaintiffs' right of recovery. The
court noted that strict liability had been applied previously in Illinois food cases on public policy grounds. Analogizing those cases,
the court stated:
L. Rev. 713 (1970); Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286 (1966). For information regarding the history which led to the adoption
of the strict liability doctrine in Illinois, see Metzger, Automobiles and Heavy Equipment,
1964 U. ILL. L.F. 725; Note, Sales-Manufacturers'Liability and the Necessity for Privity of
Contract-IllinoisHistory, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 272 (1963). See also Sommerich, A Comparative Survey of ProductsLiability Law As Applied to Motor Vehicles, 2 INT'L LAw §98 (1967).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965). The rule applies despite
the seller's exercise of "all possible care" and regardless of whether privity exists between the
seller and the injured party. Id. § 402A(2) (1965).
13. 32 111.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
14. 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964).
15. Only Bendix sought review of the appellate court's ruling.
STAN.
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Without extended discussion, it seems obvious that public interest
in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one
creating the risk and reaping the profit are present and as compelling in cases involving motor vehicles and other products, where
the defective condition makes them unreasonably dangerous to the
user, as they are in food cases. 6
The court did, however, reaffirm that the recognition of strict liability does not make the defendant an absolute insurer, since the plaintiffs were still obligated to prove that their injury or damage resulted from an unreasonably dangerous condition of the product
which existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control. 7
While Suvada involved the application of the strict liability doctrine solely to a manufacturer, subsequent decisions have extended
its scope to include all participants in the distributive chain,, be
they wholesalers 9 or retailers. 20 Indeed, in a later case, such extension was regarded by the supreme court as implicit in the Suvada
decision itself. In Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co.,21 the
supreme court affirmed judgments in favor of the plaintiff in a suit
against the manufacturer and wholesaler of a defective hammer.
There the court declared that the scope of strict liability encompasses all persons in the distributive scheme."2 However, until the
Peterson case, no Illinois court had taken the further step of extending strict liability to a seller 3 outside the distributive chain.2 4
16. 32 Ill. 2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The court also canvassed the historical growth
which led to the abandonment of the privity requirement and the recognition of strict liability
in tort. In addition, the court expressed its agreement with the Greenman decision, among
others, and observed that its views coincided with the position taken in section 402A of the
Restatement. Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187. See also Ozmon, Products Liability Under the
Suvada Theory, 55 ILL. BAR J. 906 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Ozmon], wherein the writer
conducted an exhaustive and remarkably prescient survey of the long-range impact of the
Suvada decision. Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966)
(examining the policy and repercussions of Suvada).
17. 32 I1. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
18. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
19. Id.
20. Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 111.App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968), aff'd, 46 fI1. 2d 64,
264 N.E.2d 170 (1970); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 111.App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347
(1966).
21. 42 IIl. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
22. Id. at 344, 247 N.E.2d at 404. Interestingly, the plaintiff sought recovery from the
manufacturer and wholesaler, but did not join the retailer who had sold the hammer to him.
86 I1. App. 2d 315, 319, 229 N.E.2d 684, 686 (1967).
23. But cf. Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971), where the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that the strict liability doctrine applies to
motor vehicle lessors.
24. The distributive chain extends from the manufacturer to the initial purchaser. Since
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Strict Liability
POLICY OF STRICT PRODUCTS

LIABILITY-THE

APPELLATE COURT'S APPROACH

The appellate court premised its holding on the "fundamental
policy of strict products liability" expressed by the supreme court
in Suvada. After reviewing the reasons given by the Suvada court
for recognizing strict liability, the appellate court pointed out that
Suvada's rationale was equally applicable where the defendant is
not a manufacturer, but rather a used car dealer.
Although sellers and dealers of used motor vehicles do not "create
the risk" in the sense that this phrase was used in Suvada, it is
readily apparent that such sellers and dealers do place motor vehicles into the stream of commerce in a manner not unlike that of a
manufacturer or retailer."

Accordingly, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had met the Suvada
pleading requirements despite their failure to trace the alleged de-

fects back to the manufacturer."
Moreover, the appellate court went one step further by holding
that the "deterrence purpose behind strict liability mandates the
'
rule's application in this case. "21
The court reasoned that imposition
of liability would serve the beneficial function of increasing auto
safety, since used car dealers would take every precaution to avoid
strict liability. Hence the court simultaneously 1) eliminated procea seller outside the chain will have obtained the automobile directly from or indirectly
through the initial purchaser, the automobile will generally be used, in the sense of normal
wear and tear. However, the fact that the automobile is used need not lead to the issue
confronted by the Peterson court. To illustrate: suppose that, in Peterson, the manufacturer
were being sued, the allegation being that the automobile was in an unreasonably dangerous
condition when it left the manufacturer's control, with such condition proximately causing
injury to the plaintiffs. It is suggested that, since the Suvada requirements would be met, a
cause of action would be stated, despite the fact that the defective product which caused the
injury was a used automobile. Accord, Note, Strict Tort Liability in Automobile Liability
Legislation, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 567, 577 (1966); McLain v. Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971). Therefore, it would seem that the novelty of Peterson arises, not because
the product at issue was used, but rather because the dealer, as the seller of such a product,
is a party outside the distributive chain. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5.
25. 17 Ill.
App. 3d at 693, 307 N.E.2d at 731.
26. The court also remarked that a similar argument had been made and rejected in
Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968), af/'d, 46 Il.2d 64, 264 N.E.2d
170 (1970), where the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District recognized that strict
liability extends to the seller of a defective product. The court further observed that the
Sweeney decision was consistent with the plain terms of section 402A of the Restatement,
which applies to "any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment f (1965) (emphasis added). Finally,
the court noted that there is no express limitation of liability in section 402A to defects
occurring in the manufacturing process. Id., comment g. See also comment d, which provides
that the rule "extends to any product sold in the condition ...
in which it is expected to
reach the ultimate user or consumer."
27. 17 Ill. App. 3d at 694, 307 N.E.2d at 732 (emphasis added).
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dural and theoretical barriers to a strict liability action against a
used car dealer and 2) took an affirmative public policy stance
favoring strict liability.
Generally, the policy justifications which the courts have advanced in the past in support of strict liability have fallen into three
broad categories: deterrence, liability for representation of safeness,
and allocation of risk.2" The analysis in Suvada is illustrative. There
the court drew an analogy to cases where it had previously recognized the application of strict liability to manufacturers and sellers
of food. The court summarized the arguments supporting the imposition of liability in those cases:
(1) The public interest in human life and health demands all the
protection the law can give against the sale of unwholesome food.
(2) The manufacturer solicits and invites the use of his product
by packaging advertising or otherwise, representing to the public
that it is safe and suitable for use. Having thus induced use of the
product, the law will impose liability for the damage it causes.
(3) The losses caused by unwholesome food should be borne by
those who have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing
the product in the stream of commerce."
It would appear that the second of these three justifications has
little relevance in the instant case. The seller of an automobile in
"as is"condition 30 presumably does not represent that the automobile is "safe and suitable for use. '31 Nor is the rationale for any
implied representation very persuasive. It is true that the purchaser
of a used automobile may have certain expectations regarding its
future performance. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the
28. Cf. Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 11. Instead of risk allocation, Prosser proposed a different third justification for the recognition of strict liability: namely, that strict
liability avoids the necessity for a circuitous series of breach of warranty actions. He did
discuss risk allocation, a justification which he deemed entitled to more "respect" than other
alternatives advanced. Nevertheless, mindful of the fact that Dean Pound had termed the
concept socialistic, Prosser expressed the view that the idea was perhaps ahead of its time.
Id. at 1120-24. Contrast this with the position of Professor Keeton, who sees risk allocation
as the principal reason for the doctrine. Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations
About Allocation of Risks, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966).
29. 32 Ill. 2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186 (citations omitted). The court then concluded that
these arguments were no less cogent in cases involving "motor vehicles and other products,
where the defective condition makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user." Id.
30. This automobile was sold "as is." Petition for Rehearing at 3. For an understanding
of what is meant by the term "as is," see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-316(3)(a) (1973) and the
accompanying Illinois Code Comment. For further discussion, see cases cited note 133 infra.
See also Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954); Thrash v. UDrive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
31. Cf. Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U.
ILL. L.F. 693, 694-95 [hereinafter cited as Strict Liability]. See generally Chamberlain v. Bob
Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (1967).
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existence of such expectations provides a sufficient basis for an
implied representation of safety and suitability for use in a case
featuring a used car sale. This is especially so where the sale is
accompanied by a disclaimer excluding all implied warranties.32
Understandably, the appellate court did not rest its holding upon
this theory, realizing that the other justifications-deterrence
and
3
risk allocation-afforded stronger support for its position.
The court laid great stress upon the deterrence justification, observing that
if the seller of used motor vehicles knows that he may be held
strictly liable for the sale of a defective vehicle that may result in
injury to the purchaser or another, he will obviously exert every
precaution to avoid the potential injury and liability that may
occur. This factor of deterrence as justification
for the imposition
3
of strict products liability is well established .
Indeed, the court went so far as to declare that this justification
"mandated" a judgment for the plaintiffs.
32. By selling an automobile "as is," a dealer will not necessarily succeed in excluding
all implied warranties. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-316(3)(a) (1973) does permit evidence of a
contrary intent:
• . . unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language which in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty (emphasis added).
In addition, the recently enacted Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides that suppliers of
consumer products, including used car dealers, may not disclaim any implied warranties
attaching to the sale of such products if any written warranties are executed. Disclaimers
made in violation of the statute are deemed ineffective for purposes of the Act and state law.
15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1975 Supp.). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-302 (1973) (providing that a
court may refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or clause thereoO; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
26, § 2-719(3) (1973) (declaring that a contract limiting consequential damages due to personal injuries is prima facie unconscionable). These clauses have been used by at least one
court to strike down an "as is" warranty exclusion clause. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc.
2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See generally Davenport, Unconscionabilityand
the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAmi L. REV. 121 (1967); Note, The Applicability of
the Doctrine of Unconscionabilityto Warranties:A Move Toward Strict Liability Within the
U C.C., 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 73 (1969). For further discussion, see note 131 infra.
33. See Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 282, 509 P.2d 529, 539 (1973) (dissenting opinion) for the view that such an implied representation is an unnecessary fiction, given
the existence of the other two justifications. Also, Prosser argues that the principle of bystander recovery cannot be explained on the basis of the safety representation justification,
because the bystander, unlike the user or consumer of the product, has not been the recipient
of any representations made by the seller. The seller has not sought out the bystander, and
the bystander's contact with the product has been coincidental. Fall of the Citadel, supra
note 11, at 819. Accord, Note, Caveat Venditor-StrictProducts Liability Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 291 (1968). Hence, allowance of bystander recovery
would seem to indicate that the other justifications are of greater importance.
34. 17 Ill. App. 3d at 694, 307 N.E.2d at 732 (citations omitted).
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In emphasizing the importance of the deterrence justification in
the doctrine of strict liability, the court was on solid ground. Mr.
Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. ,"
cited by the appellate court in Peterson, contains one of the earliest
and best formulations of the doctrine. There, Justice Traynor
argued that the scope of a manufacturer's liability should be more
inclusive than that recognized under the theory of negligence, since
[e]ven if there is no negligence . . .public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate
some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the
public cannot . . . .It is in the public interest to discourage the
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the
public.3
This reasoning has also been applied to the liability of wholesalers
and retailers. In Dunham, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
strict liability extends to wholesalers as well as manufacturers, reasoning that the former's liability arises from his integral role in the
producing enterprise and "affords an additional incentive to
safety.""7 In support of its decision, the Dunham court cited the
California Supreme Court decision of Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co. 31 In that case, the court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Traynor, indicated the reasons why extending strict liability to retailers may serve as an added safety incentive:
In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that
[producing and marketing] enterprise reasonably available to the
injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a
substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in
a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the
retailer's
strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to
39
safety.
35. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
36. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
37. 42 II. 2d at 344, 247 N.E.2d at 404. For further discussion of Dunham, see text
accompanying notes 18 through 22 supra.
38. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
39. Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. Here the court found liability
even though there was apparently no defect in the automobile when it left the hands of the
manufacturer, on the grounds that the manufacturer has a non-delegable duty to make his
products safe and cannot escape liability by having his dealers complete the final processing
of the automobiles he manufactures. But cf. Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 59 Ill.
2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974), where the Illinois Supreme Court held that a manufacturer who
had failed to install a safety device in a piece of machinery was free from liability. The court
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In the context of the Peterson case, the strict liability doctrine
was applied to a used car dealer, who does not ordinarily have the
leverage to exert much pressure upon the manufacturer, even if the
defect is found to have been created in the manufacturing process. 0
However, the dealer himself is in a position to take steps to ensure
the safety of the automobiles he sells by inspecting for and correcting defects, an opportunity alluded to by the Vandermark court.4
To the extent that imposition of strict liability would lead used car
dealers to more carefully prepare their products for sale, the deterrence or safety incentive justification would be served. 2 However,
whether this necessarily allows, let alone compels, the imposition of
liability is another question, as the supreme court's decision aptly
indicates.
Risk allocation has been the other primary justification advanced
for the creation and imposition of strict liability. The rationale of
this justification is that, as the supreme court declared in Suvada,
the losses caused by a defective product should be borne by those
who created the risk of loss by introducing the product into the
stream of commerce. 3 As Justice Traynor noted in Escola, the injured party should not be burdened with the cost of his injury,
especially since "the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.""4
reasoned that, even if the machinery had been in an unreasonably dangerous condition when
it left the manufacturer's control, this condition was corrected when the employer who had
purchased the machinery installed his own safety device. Thus, the later failure of the device
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Klucyznski argued
that the court's approach would "insulate a manufacturer from liability on the fortuitous
intervention of the purchaser .... 59111. 2d at 88-89, 319 N.Eo2d at 237. In contrast, Justice
Klucyznski would condition liability on whether it was foreseeable that the purchaser would
install a defective or otherwise ineffective safety device. Id.
40. However, note the availability of indemnity in this situation as a means of exerting
pressure. See notes 61 through 65 infra and accompanying text.
41. 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
42. Prosser questions whether imposition of strict liability will have such a deterrent
effect, since the seller may not be "stimulated by the relatively slight increase in liability
[over that of negligence] to take additional precautions against defects which cannot be
prevented by only reasonable care." Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 11, at 1119. However, this ignores the fact that a strict liability action offers a number of procedural advantages over the negligence suit, thereby making recovery perhaps more likely in the former
case. If true, this would have a deterrent effect itself.
43. 32 Ill. 2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186. This person may not be the party best able
financially to absorb the loss.
44. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. This theory has also been labeled enterprise
liability. For a definition of this term, see Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 30708, 405 P.2d 624, 627-28. A thoughtful treatment of the implications of enterprise liability is
contained in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437-44, 191 N.E.2d 81,
83-87 (1963) (Burke, J., dissenting).
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In Peterson, the appellate court did not stress the risk allocation
justification, perhaps on the grounds that the case for thrusting the
burden on the defendant is less persuasive where the defendant is a
seller outside the chain of distribution than where the defendant is
a manufacturer, distributor or retailer. The court did discuss risk
allocation, however, in response to the defendant's arguments
against the imposition of liability.
The defendant in Peterson argued that strict liability should not
be imposed upon the used car dealer because he, unlike a new car
dealer, cannot arrive at indemnity and price agreements with the
manufacturer. The defendant also asserted that, if held to such a
standard of liability, the dealer would be forced to disassemble and
inspect each automobile prior to resale.45 Underlying the defendant's position, of course, is the belief that the burden of loss placed
upon him would be unduly great if strict liability was recognized.
One short answer to these contentions might be that the burden
now placed upon the purchaser, user or bystander outweighs that
which would be placed upon the dealer. Assuming this were true,
however, would not dispose of the problem of optimal risk allocation.4" If dealers would be inordinately burdened by the imposition
of strict liability, then perhaps the current allocation should be
retained, despite the incidence of loss suffered by injured parties in
individual cases.
The court succinctly dealt with these objections in the following
language:
There is no obligation upon a dealer to accept a "trade-in", or
purchase a used vehicle at auction; but if he does, he can properly
inspect the vehicle in advance and offer a trade-in or auction price
which reflects the cost of any repairs the dealer anticipates will be
necessary in order to make the vehicle reasonably safe. The cost
of these repairs can further be distributed or absorbed upon re-sale
of the used vehicle. Furthermore, like a manufacturer or retailer,
the used car dealer can insure his enterprise against any unexpected liability arising from one of the vehicles which he placed
into the stream of commerce."
45. 17 Ill. App. 3d at 696-97, 307 N.E.2d 733.
46. Optimal risk allocation is somewhat of a misnomer. If this were the key, a plaintiff
could recover even if the injury were not foreseeable or the condition not unreasonably dangerous. Such is not the case. See Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the
Requirement of a Defect, 41 Tax. L. Ray. 855, 859 (1963). See generally Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
47. 17 Ill. App. 3d at 697, 307 N.E.2d at 734. The court might also have added that the
dealer could negotiate a price agreement or indemnity arrangement with the manufacturer,
assuming that the former is engaged in the purchase and sale of both new and used cars and
that the manufacturer is agreeable to the scheme.
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It should also be noted that liability insurance 8 would allow the
dealer protection even in those cases where defects could not be
discovered without disassembling the automobile, an undertaking
which rould be prohibitively expensive for the average dealer. The
premiums for liability insurance, like the costs of repair, could presumably be passed on to the dealer's customers." In short, the
dealer would be able to pass the costs of repair on to his customers
in the case of discoverable defects and carry liability insurance to
cover all risks of loss.50 In either event, the dealer is not unduly
burdened and the innocent user or bystander is compensated for his
injury or damage.
The appellate court presented a compelling argument for the imposition of strict liability on the basis of risk allocation. This does
not mean, however, that the dealer would be able to shift the entire
burden. For example, the dealer's local market might be highly
competitive-if some dealers decided to absorb the added expenses
resulting from repair operations and insurance premiums rather
than pass these expenses on to the consumer, other dealers might
feel obliged to follow suit.5' Nonetheless, it does not follow that
liability should not be imposed in the first place. Were it otherwise,
the dealer would escape all costs incident to strict liability, merely
because some of these costs might prove non-transferable.
THE USED CAR DEALER AS INSURER-THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE

In its reversal, the Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Schaefer, adopted a fundamentally different view of the
equities of the case. Significantly, the court did not dispute the
48.

For further information on products liability insurance, see W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK

§ 82-83 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER ON TORTS]; R.
HURSH and H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2d §§ 13:1 et seq. (1974); Annot.,
OF THE LAW OF TORTS

45 A.L.R.2d 994 (1956); Swift & Co. v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co., 130 Ill. App. 2d 68,
264 N.E.2d 389 (1970) (surveying the purpose and limitations of products liability insurance).
49. Prosser cautions against resort to the device of liability insurance as a method for
curing social ills. He argues that "[wihat insurance can do, of course, is to distribute losses
proportionately among a group who are to bear them. What it cannot and should not do is to
determine whether the group shall bear them in the first place ....
" Assault Upon the
Citadel, supra note 11, at 1121. He also relates that, as of the time of the writing of his article,
only Justice Traynor in his Escola concurrence had even mentioned insurance as a factor for
the court to consider in deciding whether to impose liability. See also PROSSER ON TORTS,
supra note 48, ch. 14, § 83, at 547-56. But see Strict Liability, supra note 31, at 695-96;
Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951), reprinted in 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1422, 1447-48
(1966).
50. This would answer one of the defendant's chief objections: that recognition of strict
liability would force dealers to completely disassemble each automobile prior to resale. 17 Ill.
App. 3d at 696-97, 307 N.E.2d at 733.
51. Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 11, at 1121.
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appellate court's assertion that recognition of strict liability would
increase auto safety by encouraging dealer inspections and repairs.
Nor did the court challenge the appellate court's premise that a
variety of devices would enable the dealer to minimize any burden
incident to liability. In fact, the supreme court took issue with the
appellate court in essentially one respect: the supreme court rejected the argument that public policy demands that used car dealers be held strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in the automobiles they sell. However, even this statement requires qualification.
The supreme court first observed that the strict liability of manufacturers is predicated, at least in part, upon the notion that losses
should be borne by those who have "created the risk and reaped the
profit by placing the product in the stream of commerce.""2 Wholesalers and retailers are subject to strict liability on the theory that
they are in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to
enhance the safety of his products,53 the court noted. Therefore,
because of the availability of indemnity, the loss will "ordinarily be
ultimately borne by the party that created the risk."54
This, at the outset, outlines the court's underlying premise: the
purpose of strict liability is to put the loss resulting from defective
products upon the party who created the risk of loss by causing the
defect. While this party will ordinarily be the manufacturer, wholesalers and retailers are also held strictly liable in their roles as
adjuncts to the manufacturer. Any injustice stemming from the
decision to extend strict liability to innocent wholesalers and retailers is removed by allowing these parties to pass the loss back to the
manufacturer by means of indemnification. 5
52. 61 Ill. 2d at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 786.
53. Compare this to the language of Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., cited here by the
supreme court, wherein the California Supreme Court also stated that "the retailer himself
may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe ..
" 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391
P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. Since the quoted language has obvious application
to the case at bar, its omission by the supreme court is puzzling.
54. 61 Ill. 2d at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
55. In following the California court's lead, the supreme court seems to have uncritically
accepted the proposition that the mere opportunity to exert pressure upon the manufacturer
justifies the imposition of liability upon wholesalers and retailers. Whether such opportunity
necessarily exists is subject to some dispute but, this question aside, it appears that the more
persuasive rationale for imposing liability under these circumstances is that strict liability is
a seller's liability. Several courts have interpreted Suvada as applying not only to manufacturers but also to sellers of defective products: Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill.
App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969); Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 1ll. App. 2d 70, 215
N.E.2d 465 (1966); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966).
Similarly, in Dunham, the supreme court said that Suvada affirmed the principle that strict
liability applies to "all elements in the distribution system." 42 Ill. 2d at 344, 247 N.E.2d at
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It is logical that the court would probably embrace the converse
of this position. If a party has not created the defect and has no
opportunity to seek indemnity from the "guilty" party, that individual should not be subjected to strict liability. The court's words offer
confirmation:
There is no allegation that the defects existed when the product
left the control of the manufacturer. Nor is there any allegation
that the defects were created by the used car dealer. .

.

.If strict

liability is imposed upon the facts alleged here, the used car dealer
would in effect become an insurer against defects which had come
into existence after the chain of distribution was completed, and
while the product was under the control of one or more consumers.56
The court ended its discussion by conceding that "[i]t may well be
that a heavy responsibility should be imposed upon used car dealers
for the safety of the cars they sell." 57 Nonetheless, the court concluded that it was not aware of any other decisions that have so held
and, choosing not to be the first to blaze a new trail,5" the court
404. That the primary liability is a seller's liability is evident upon a close reading of Suvada.
There, in discussing the deterrence and risk allocation justifications, the court cited as its
sole supporting authority the case of Wiedman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1898),
wherein the Illinois Supreme Court held that a retailer who sells unwholesome food is liable,
upon public policy grounds, for breach of an implied warranty of fitness. In Suvada, the court
recognized that Wiedman created a species of strict liability, albeit one based upon implied
warranty. Thus wholesalers and retailers are strictly liable in their own right, and not merely
as adjuncts to the manufacturer.
56. 61 111. 2d at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787. Curiously, the court followed this quote with a
citation to comment f of the Restatement, which provides that section 402A applies to "any
person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption." RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment f (1965). The comment goes on to declare that the basis
for the rule is
the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken
by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with products which
may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon
that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods.
Id. It is difficult to see how the language of comment f supports the proposition for which it
is cited, unless the court intended to highlight the fact that the doctrine does not apply to
private parties, who may in this instance have created the alleged defects.
57. 61 111. 2d at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
58. Actually, had the court recognized strict liability, it would not have been the first
court to have done so. The issue of whether strict liability applies to used car dealers was
presented in the case of Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971). In
Cornelius, the court reserved ruling on the issue, but assumed for purposes of its decision that
such an action could be maintained. In several other cases, the applicability of the doctrine
to sellers of used motor vehicles has been assumed without discussion of the relevant policy
arguments: Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970); Grady v. Kenny Ross Chevrolet
Co., 332 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Mixter v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 313, 308
A.2d 139 (1973). See McLain v. Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) where a seller
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reversed the judgment of the appellate court.59
The most striking aspect of this analysis is that the supreme court
totally ignored the policy justifications upon which the appellate
court had so clearly relied. The appellate court had declared that
the deterrence purpose mandated recognition of liability, a determination left unrefuted by the supreme court's opinion. Therefore it
would seem that the supreme court's view was that liability should
be refused, regardless of whether and to what extent the policy
objectives of strict liability might be served by its recognition. With
the failure to consider these relevant policy arguments, the availability of indemnity becomes the controlling factor in the court's
of a used rifle held strictly liable because defect in gun was present when sold new to first
purchaser. The rifle had been returned to the defendant seller and resold to the plaintiff.
In Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974), the Supreme Court
of New Jersey considered, but did not reach, the question of whether the seller of any defective
product may be held strictly liable. The court ruled instead that "a used car dealer ought to
be subject to strict liability in tort with respect to a mishap resulting from any defective work,
repairs or replacements he has done or made on the vehicle before the sale." Id. at 344-45,
322 A.2d at 444. The question left open in Realmuto was answered in the affirmative in
Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975), where the court
concluded that public policy demands the imposition of strict liability upon the seller of a
used motor vehicle, at least where the vehicle is sold as a serviceable means of transport and
absent special circumstances justifying non-recognition.
Apparently the only decision extending strict liability, without qualification, to used car
dealers is that of Lewis v. E.F. Moore, Inc., 87 Montg. Co. Law Rep. 379 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pls.
1967). In Lewis, the plaintiff purchased an automobile with allegedly defective brakes from
the defendant used car dealer. Within 15 minutes after leaving the dealer's lot, the brakes
failed, causing an accident with subsequent injury to the plaintiff. Rejecting the defendant's
argument that section 402A should not control in cases involving used automobiles, the court
ruled that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action since the Restatement section applies to
"one who sells any product in a defective condition," and is not limited to new products. Id.
at 380. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 337 (1973).
59. The court found support for its holding in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 262L (1973), a
section of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act which creates a warranty for cost of repairs of power train components for new cars and used cars less than four
years old. The court attached significance to the limitations of the warranty: the warranty
covers only power train components, lasts only for a period of 30 days from date of delivery,
and specifies that the dealer's share of repair costs is a maximum of 50%. The court concluded
that "[n]o intimations of an expanded public policy concerning a used car dealer's responsibility for the condition of the car he sells can be drawn from the severely restrictive provisions
of this statute." 61 lIl. 2d at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787. In reality, however, such intimations can
readily be drawn, since the warranty accords a measure of consumer protection over and
above that afforded by other warranties which may arise and is not excluded unless the
disclaimer incorporates the exact wording and fulfills the other requirements set forth in the
statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 262L(b) (1973); Overland Bond and Inv. Corp. v. Howard,
9 I1. App. 3d 348, 353, 292 N.E.2d 168, 172 (1972). Viewed in this perspective, the
statute becomes an expression of increased legislative awareness regarding the problems
confronted by purchasers of defective automobiles and the dealer's responsibility to help solve
those problems.
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determination."0
Indemnity is a device whereby parties held liable can be compensated by others whose culpability is qualitatively greater. Although
initially developed in negligence cases, the theory has been extended to the strict liability context." Suvada itself was an indemnity case. The supreme court allowed the purchaser of a tractortrailer unit who had settled personal injury and property damage
claims to seek indemnity from the manufacturer of the defective
brakes which had caused the accident. Relying upon Suvada, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District declared in Texaco,
Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co. ,"2 that liability for indemnity exists in
the case of any party in the distributive chain who places a product
"in the stream of commerce with the knowledge of its intended
use.9' 13 There the plaintiffs were two contractors and a property
owner who had settled the claims of a person injured when scaffolding collapsed at a construction site. The plaintiffs sued McGrew, the
supplier of the lumber used in the building of the scaffold, which in
turn filed a third party complaint against its supplier, Fred Bahr.
Although the plaintiffs were successful in their indemnity action
against McGrew, the court permitted McGrew to pass the loss to
Bahr by way of indemnity upon proof that the lumber had been
defective while in Bahr's possession.
Consequently, while Suvada and Texaco are factually parallel,
Texaco goes further by implicitly recognizing the right of parties in
the distributive chain to seek indemnification. The supreme court
eliminated any doubts concerning this proposition by emphasizing
in Peterson that "a wholesaler or retailer who neither creates nor
assumes the risk is entitled to indemnity," 4 citing Suvada and
Texaco as supporting authority.
It is evident that the defendant in Peterson would not enjoy the
same protection afforded wholesalers and retailers by the indemnity
device. Insofar as the alleged defects came into existence, in all
60.

Chief Justice Underwood commented during oral argument that since the alleged

defects had not been present when the automobile was under the control of General Motors,
its manufacturer, the defendant would be unable to recover against that party. This statement reflects the court's concern about the availability of indemnity.
61. For a general background on the subject of indemnity, with emphasis upon this
context, see PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 48, § 51, at 310-13 (4th ed. 1971); Feirich, Third
Party Practice, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 236, 239-45; Note, The Right to Indemnity in Products
Liability Cases, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 614; Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 (1969).
62. 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 (1969).
63. Id. at 357, 254 N.E.2d at 588.
64. 61 Ill. 2d at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 787. For further discussion, see notes 116 through 120
infra and accompanying text.
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probability, while the automobile was under the control of one or
more private owners, the defendant would be barred from indemnity, since private sellers cannot be held strictly liable. 5 Nevertheless, the availability of indemnity has never been regarded as justifying, without more, the recognition of strict liability. Nor has the
inability to utilize the device been considered a reason for declining
to extend liability. However, it must be recalled that, prior to
Peterson, no Illinois court had been confronted with the quandry of
whether to extend strict liability to a seller who neither had created
the defect nor had opportunity to recover from the responsible
party.
As the supreme court observed, to hold a used car dealer liable
in this situation would make him a virtual insurer of the automobile. The concept of the defendant as insurer has been a recurring
theme in strict liability law. In Suvada, the supreme court proclaimed that recognition of strict liability would not make the manufacturer an insurer of his products, because the plaintiffs were still
obliged to prove injury or damage, a causal link between that injury
or damage and an unreasonably dangerous condition of the product,
and that this condition existed when the product left the manufacturer's control."
7
The insurer theme reappeared recently in Winnett v. Winnett.1
There the plaintiff was a four-year-old child who had been injured
when she placed her hand on a moving conveyor belt. The plaintiff
sued, among others, the manufacturer of the forage wagon contain65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965). Although a private seller
cannot be sued on the basis of strict liability, making an indemnity action grounded upon
such liability impossible, recovery is not necessarily precluded. The general rule is to deny
indemnity where sought by a party in the distributive chain from a person outside the chain,
even if the latter is guilty of negligence. Kossifos v. Louden Machinery Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d
587, 317 N.E.2d 749 (1974); Stanfield v. Medalist Industries, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309
N.E.2d 104 (1974); Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973),
aff'd, 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974). In Kossifos, indemnity was alternatively sought
on the basis of the third party's misuse, but the court declined to reach the issue due to the
defendant's failure to properly raise the issue in the pleadings. However, in Burke, the supreme court dismissed a third party complaint for indemnity brought by a manufacturer
against a party whose misuse was allegedly the sole cause of the injury. The court reasoned
that such misuse could be asserted in the original suit to bar recovery, thus obviating the
need for indemnity. Burke does not resolve the validity of a later indemnity action where the
party seeking indemnity has failed to raise the defense in the earlier suit.
Nevertheless, these decisions were premised upon the need to prevent evasion of loss by
defendants held to a strict liability standard, the theory being that such evasion would
frustrate the public policy goals of the doctrine. Consider whether it might be appropriate to
permit used car dealers to assert negligence and/or misuse as the basis of an indemnity suit.
See Mixter v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 313, 308 A.2d 139 (1973).
66. 32 Il. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
67. 57 Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
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ing the conveyor belt. The trial court dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action in strict liability, and the appellate court reversed.6"
On appeal, the supreme court held that the complaint had been
properly dismissed. Acknowledging the manufacturer's duty to
make his products reasonably fit for their intended use, the court
nonetheless ruled that
the liability of a manufacturer properly encompasses only those
individuals to whom injury from a defective product may reasonably be foreseen and only those situations where the product is
being used for the purpose for which it was intended or for which
it is reasonably foreseeable that it may be used. Any other approach to the problem results in making the manufacturer and
those in the chain of product distribution virtual insurers of the
product, a position rejected by this court in Suvada."
Over a strong dissent,7 0 the court concluded that the plaintiff's conduct had not been reasonably foreseeable. 7'
By superimposing a foreseeability test upon the Suvada pleading
requirements, the court thought that it had devised adequate safeguards to prevent manufacturers and others in the chain of distribution from becoming insurers. Obviously, in Peterson the court decided that even more safeguards were needed to protect used car
dealers, at least in the event of consumer-created defects. Yet it is
apparent that the Peterson holding produced a decidedly different
result. In Suvada and Winnett, the court merely placed certain
bounds upon the strict liability cause of action: not every injured
plaintiff would be allowed to sue, nor would every defect give rise
to liability. In Peterson, the court insulated a used car dealer from
liability, solely because the creator of the defect was unknown and
probably immune from suit. In so ruling, the supreme court retreated from the policy-oriented outlook found in Suvada and in68. 9 Ill. App. 3d 644, 292 N.E.2d 524 (1973).
69. 57 Ill. 2d at 11, 310 N.E.2d at 4.
70. Id. at 13-15, 310 N.E.2d at 5-6. Mr. Justice Goldenhersh dissented, arguing that the
plaintiff had fulfilled Suvada's requirements for a strict liability cause of action. Justice
Goldenhersh also declared that the only foreseeability question before the court was whether
it was reasonably foreseeable that someone might be injured through contact with the product. He regarded this question as being one for the jury, not for the court ruling as a matter
of law. Cf. Cunis v. Brennan, 56 111. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974), where the court ruled that
the same foreseeability test applies in negligence actions to limit the scope of duty owed by
a defendant.
71. 57 111.2d at 13, 310 N.E.2d at 5. The court defined "foreseeable" as that which is
"objectively reasonable to expect." This same standard was employed by the court in
Williams, where the court defined the term "misuse." See text accompanying note 110 infra.
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stead embraced a culpability standard analogous to a negligence
approach.
The supreme court's reluctance to make the defendant an insurer
reflects an underlying concern that the policy objectives of the strict
liability doctrine be squared with fundamental notions of equity.
The defendant in Peterson argued that a used car dealer should not
be held responsible for damages resulting from defects he did not
create.7 He further contended that the party who trades in a car
containing a defect is the "real party at fault. ' 73 But, as Prosser
points out, fault in the context of strict liability has a broader meaning. In this sense, "fault" signifies a "departure from a standard of
conduct required of a man by society for the protection of his neighbors. . . . ",7 Therefore, because the defendant creates the risk of
harm, when that harm is realized, the attendant loss is imposed
upon him, rather than upon the innocent victim. The defendant is
held liable "merely because, as a matter of social adjustment, the
conclusion is that the responsibility should be his. '7 5 This being the
case, the dealer's "fault" would stem neither from the fact that he
has been negligent, nor because he has created a defective product,
but rather because he has placed goods in the stream of commerce
with the knowledge that some of them may prove to be defective.
That this broader concept of fault underlies strict tort liability is
manifest if one considers that the defendant in a strict liability
action will be held liable even if he has exercised "all possible care"
in the manufacture and/or sale of his product. 76 Thus the Illinois
courts have recognized liability even where the defendant had no
reasonable opportunity to ascertain the presence of the defect in the
product. 77 In addition, the Illinois courts have established that evidence relating to the state of the art or science of the defendant's
industry is irrelevant in a strict liability action, thereby barring any
defenses based upon adherence to industry-wide standards.7 s Hence
72.
73.

Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 7.
Petition for Leave to Appeal at 5.

74.

PROSSER ON

75.

Id. at 495

76.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

TORTS, supra note 48, at 493.
§ 402A(2)(a) (1965).

77. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill.
2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970)
(hospital liable for providing blood containing harmful virus); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 III. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (wholesaler liable for distributing a
defective hammer in an unopened box); Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 IIl. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d
439 (1968), afl'd, 46 Ill. 2d 64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970) (retailer liable for selling nails containing
latent defects).
78. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill.
2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970). In Cunningham, the court analyzed and rejected a variety of defense arguments in
finding that a hospital which supplies defective blood to a patient should be held strictly
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a manufacturer who has taken all possible precautions to ensure the
safety of his products remains strictly liable, as does the distributor
who acts as a mere conduit for the sale of such products.
Accordingly, imposition of strict liability upon a used car dealer
would work no inequity that would not be found in any case where
liability exists despite exercise of due care. Certainly the absence of
inequity does not dictate a finding of liability. However, if the policy
justifications supporting strict liability would be advanced, and if
imposition of liability would not, on balance, be overly burdensome,
then it seems logical that used car dealers be held strictly liable,
irrespective of the availability of indemnity, and regardless of who
actually caused the defect.7 The chief focus of the court's analysis
should have been whether these two conditions were fulfilled. Unfortunately, it was not.

A

THIRD PERSPECTIVE-THE GOLDENHERSH DISSENT

Dissenting, Mr. Justice Goldenhersh expressed still another view
regarding the equities of the case. Like the appellate court, he felt
that the defendant dealer should be held to a strict liability standard. Unlike the appellate court, Justice Goldenhersh would not
open the door to recovery in all situations. The Goldenhersh dissent
represents an attempt to bridge the gap between the appellate
court's policy-oriented approach and the supreme court's focus
upon culpability.
Succinctly stated, Justice Goldenhersh's position is that strict
liability should have been recognized in Peterson because the alleged defects would have been discoverable upon a reasonable
inspection of the automobile. Terming it "axiomatic" that a used
car dealer has a duty to make such an inspection prior to sale,
Justice Goldenhersh reasoned that "a defect discoverable upon reasonable inspection should invoke strict liability on the part of a used
car dealer, without proof of negligence in making the inspection,"80
liable for resultant injury. In the words of Mr. Justice Culbertson, writing for the court:
The concept of strict liability in tort logically, and we think, reasonably, dictates
that an entity which distributes a defective product for human consumption,
whether for profit or not, should legally bear the consequences of injury caused
thereby, rather than allowing such loss to fall upon the individual consumer who is
entirely without fault.
47 Ill.
2d at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904. Cunningham represents the outermost limit to which
the Illinois Supreme Court has extended the strict liability doctrine. The contrast between
this decision and the court's ruling in Peterson demonstrates the evolution of thought which
has occurred over the past five years.
79. This accords with the notion that Suvada created a seller's liability. See discussion
in note 55 supra.
80. 61 111. 2d at 22, 329 N.E.2d at 788.
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just as manufacturers and distributors are held strictly liable without proof of negligence.
Moreover, noting that the court had observed the plaintiffs' failure to allege that the defects had been created by the defendant, the
Justice argued:
[Tihere is no basis for distinguishing a defect resulting from repairs made by a used car dealer and a defect which exists by reason
of his failure to make a reasonable inspection, and that both should
be the basis for imposing strict liability."
Ironically, the dissent adopts the culpability standard applied by
the supreme court and utilizes it to justify the recognition of liability. While the supreme court declined to extend liability to a party
lacking responsibility for the defect and opportunity for indemnification, Justice Goldenhersh would find culpability in the dealer's
failure to conduct a reasonable inspection of the automobile. Yet the
dissent never explains why the line should be drawn here, especially
since a dealer who fails to conduct a reasonable inspection is liable
in negligence anyway.82 Nor does Justice Goldenhersh indicate why
culpability, rather than the dictates of public policy, should control
the right of recovery in strict liability.
The dissent is valuable, however, in that it highlights the central
flaw in the court's thinking. If the concern in strict liability is with
placing the burden of loss on the culpable party, why not hold a
dealer strictly liable on these facts? While the dealer may not have
actually created the defect, he surely is not without blame, assuming a failure to conduct a reasonable inspection, and, vis-a-vis the
injured plaintiff, should perhaps shoulder the loss. The difficulty,
of course, is that the distinction between strict liability and negligence is thereby blurred, if not eradicated, while the policy justifications which led to the creation and expansion of the strict liability
doctrine are lost in the process.
81. Id. at 23, 329 N.E.2d at 788. Justice Goldenhersh also found no basis for distinguishing
Peterson from Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971), where the
Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that the strict liability doctrine applies to motor
vehicle lessors. Lastly, Justice Goldenhersh noted that, where imposition of strict liability
would result in excessive repair costs, precedent exists for "weighing the cost of remedying
the dangerous condition against the nature and extent of the risk it creates." 61 Ill. 2d at 23,
329 N.E.2d at 788.
82. Kirk v. Stineway Drug Store Co., 38 111.App. 2d 415, 187 N.E.2d 307 (1963). The
defendant in Peterson conceded this point. Petition for Leave to Appeal at 12. See ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 12-301 (1973) (establishing mandatory performance standards for brakes).
One who sells an automobile with substandard brakes may be guilty of violating the statute.
Id. If so, this may be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the negligence
question. Heiser v. Chastain, 6 Ill. App. 3d 552, 285 N.E.2d 601 (1972).
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LIABILITY

The supreme court seems to have given little or no attention in
Petersonto the "unreasonably dangerous" standard as a potentially
important device for minimizing the burden incident to strict liability. Had the court fully appraised the utility of this device, it may
well have reached the conclusion that imposition of strict liability
would not unduly burden used car dealers.
Among the elements of the strict liability cause of action is the
requirement that the plaintiff prove that the condition of the product rendered it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.
This requirement had its origin in section 402A of the Restatement.
In comment i, the drafters explained the nature of the showing
necessitated by the rule:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of
harm, if only from over-consumption . . . . That is not what is
meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its character-

istics."
While some jurisdictions have abandoned the "unreasonably dangerous" rule,"4 the Illinois Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its
continuing viability in most emphatic terms. 58
Practically speaking, the meaning of the term "unreasonably
dangerous" is for the jury to decide, since the courts have noted that
the term requires no precise definition, and thus need not be the
subject of a jury instruction ." However, the language of comment i
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
84. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972);
Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973). In Cronin, the court

observed that the rule was a throwback to negligence principles and placed a considerably
greater burden upon the plaintiff than did the doctrine as articulated in Greenman. But the
court stressed that the plaintiff was still obligated to prove the existence of a defect which
proximately caused his injury.
85. Rios v. Niagara Machine Works, 59 Ill. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974). There the court
emphasized that "to establish liability in strict tort it is not sufficient that the plaintiff prove
the product was dangerous; he must prove that it was unreasonably dangerous, or in other
words not reasonably safe." Id. at 83, 319 N.E.2d at 235. For further discussion of Rios, see
note 39 supra.
86. Pyatt v. Engel Equipment, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974), wherein
the court suggested disagreement with the comment i definition, which it found to preserve
"vestiges of the reasonable man or negligence standard." Id. at 1075, 309 N.E.2d at 229. But
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was employed by the appellate court in Petersonin a manner which
demonstrates the implications of the "unreasonably dangerous"
standard.
Assuming that the plaintiff must prove that the product was in a
condition "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer," 7 the question then arises
as to what the ordinary consumer might indeed expect of a used car.
In Peterson, the defendant argued, and properly so, that the purchaser of a used automobile has expectations which undoubtedly
differ from those of a new car buyer.8 However, the appellate court
stressed that a product which has had wear and tear is not necessarily unreasonably dangerous for that reason, pointing out that
[t]here may, however, be instances where a particular used car,
at the time of sale, is so worn or is in such a condition that the
ordinary consumer would expect certain defects to be present...
or the sale may be accompanied by a warning brought to the purchaser's attention that is definite and specific enough so that the
ordinary purchaser would not expect a car to function safely without repair of the warned-of defect.8 '
The significance of this dicta is immediately apparent. A used car
dealer may be able to avoid liability where the car is in a condition
sufficiently poor so that the ordinary consumer would expect to find
defects of the type which subsequently caused injury to the plaintiff. ° Moreover, the dealer may escape liability even where the automobile is not in such a condition where he gives a specific, definite
warning of the particular defect to his buyer, assuming that an
ordinary consumer given the same warning would not expect the car
to operate safely unless and until the defect was corrected."
see Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?,22 Bus. LAw 589, 593
(1967) (the "soundest test" is the one contained in comment i). Compare Wade, supra note
11, at 15-17, who advances another test: would the reasonably prudent person have placed
the product on the market, assuming knowledge of its condition and attendant dangers?
Admitting that this test is analogous to a negligence approach, Wade lists seven factors to
be considered in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965) (emphasis added).
88. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 5-6.
89. 17 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 307 N.E.2d at 732 (citation omitted).
90. The court also stated that, in ascertaining this condition, the jury could weigh express
representations made by the seller to the buyer, presumably as evidence of the automobile's
actual condition upon sale. Id. at 695-96, 307 N.E.2d at 733. The court left the impression
that the jury could assess breaches of such representations in deciding the liability issue. Such
a view would blur the distinction between warranty and strict liability. However, the court
explicitly labeled its remarks as dicta, so they should be interpreted accordingly. Id. at 695,
307 N.E.2d at 732.
91. This is not a disclaimer of warranties, the defendant's claims notwithstanding, al-
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Therefore, in the appellate court's view an automobile may be
defective or even dangerous and yet not be unreasonably dangerous,
depending upon the condition of the automobile and the warnings
accompanying its sale." It should also be mentioned that the "unreasonably dangerous" rule invites comparisons with the assumption of risk defense, but the two theories are distinct-while the
former looks only to the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer, the latter demands actual awareness on the part of the
3
individual purchaser.'
The decision in Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc.," relied on by the
appellate court in Peterson, represents the degree to which the "unreasonably dangerous" rule may militate against recovery in a strict
liability action brought against a used car dealer. In that case, the
plaintiff was a bystander who brought suit against the seller of a
though its effect is similar. Petition for Rehearing at 3-4. A warranty disclaimer, as such, is
ineffective as a bar to an action based upon strict liability. Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc.,
67 Ill.
App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966). But see Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.
1970), where the court held that sale of an allegedly defective automobile to a used car dealer
operated to relieve the defendant dealer of liability for injuries occurring after the automobile's resale. The court theorized that responsibility had been shifted to the second dealer,
who was "justifiably relied upon to inspect the product and remedy any dangerous defect."
Id. at 199. Ikerd was a diversity case and, while the court cited no Indiana decisions, it
apparently was applying the law of that state. See also Wade, supra note 11, at 22, for the
view that tort remedies may be waived by agreement unless allowance of waiver would violate
public policy. It is implicit in the supreme court's establishment of the assumption of risk
defense that the right to bring a strict liability action is subject to waiver. See, Williams v.
Brown Mfg. Co., 45 ll. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
92. Presumably, application of the comment i test would be troublesome where the plaintiff is a bystander who has had no opportunity to assess the condition of the automobile or
receive the benefit of any warnings from its seller. In this instance, the test would probably
require adaptation, especially since the bystander may be entitled to a greater measure of
protection than that accorded the purchaser. See text accompanying note 106 infra.
93. Assumption of risk has been defined as present where a person "knows a product is
in a dangerous condition and proceeds in disregard of this known danger." Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.
2d at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 309. Since liability will not arise unless the product
is unreasonably dangerous, it would appear that the defense will bar recovery only where the
plaintiff knew that the product was not merely dangerous, but unreasonably dangerous. Cf.
Noel, Defective Products:Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk,
25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 127 (1972), wherein the author stated of the assumption of risk defense:
"The crucial fact ... is whether the plaintiff fully appreciated the risk" (emphasis addled).
Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965). Theoretically, the unreasonably dangerous rule, extends the assumption of risk defense by disallowing recovery even
where the plaintiff has not actually appreciated the risk. Practically speaking, the extension
should be negligible. Note that the Williams court also held that the jury need not accept
the plaintiff's testimony on this issue if it is too implausible to be true. 45 Ill. 2d at 430-31,
261 N.E.2d at 312. As a result, a jury may be inclined to find an assumption of risk where
the plaintiff is given a warning which the ordinary consumer would have appreciated. Also,
the assumption of risk defense will be enforceable only against a person assuming the risk,
so it will ordinarily be inapplicable in bystander suits.
94. 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971).
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used automobile whose brakes had failed, resulting in plaintiff's
injury. Assuming without deciding that used car dealers are subject
to strict liability 5 and that bystanders are entitled to recover under
that doctrine, the court nonetheless held for the defendant. The
court rested its decision upon the fact that the jury could properly
have found that the automobile in question was not unreasonably
dangerous. Specifically, the court determined that the jury could
have properly concluded, based upon its own experience, that
the "ordinary purchaser" in Coos Bay, Oregon, of a seven-year old
used car for $500 would expect or "contemplate" that after seven
years and 50,000 miles of use some of the materials used in the
construction of such a car.. . might have crystalized or deteriorated to the point that such materials might break or collapse at
any time."
The court refused to rule that the automobile had been unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. 7 Cornelius stands for the proposition that the ordinary consumer may have low expectations regarding used car performance. 8 Application of the "unreasonably
dangerous" rule, in this instance, would preclude liability.
Although this result is perhaps extreme, its rationale is compatible with the spirit of Illinois precedents. As Mr. Justice Schaefer
noted in Dunham, all of the definitions of "defect" rest upon the
common premise that defective products are those "which are dan95. The court noted that section 402A is binding upon the seller of "any product" and
that no contention had been made that the section was not binding upon sellers of used
products, a comment difficult to reconcile with the court's reserved ruling. Id. at 571, 484 P.2d
at 303 n.4.
96. Id. at 576, 484 P.2d at 305. This was true although the salesman had
assured the
purchaser that the automobile was in good condition, the salesman and the purchaser had
each given the car a braking test, and the defect had been latent or at least not readily
discoverable. But cf. the concurring opinion in Cornelius by Chief Justice O'Connell, wherein
it was argued that the court should determine whether used car dealers generally make some
type of representation to their customers regarding the quality of the automobiles they sell.
If not, then the ordinary consumer could not reasonably expect the automobile to perform in
accordance with such representation, thereby enabling the court to render judgment for the
defendant as a matter of law. Id. at 577-82, 484 P.2d at 306-08. See also Wade, supra note
11, -at 17-18.
97. The court did not exclude the possibility of so ruling in a future case featuring "dangerous defects which are either known by the dealer or which he should have known by
reasonable testing and visual inspection .... Id. at 574-75, 484 P.2d at 304. Cornelius did
not present such a case, because the evidence was such that the jury could have determined
that the alleged defect had been latent, thus not discoverable by reasonable testing or visual
inspection.
98. In determining whether the automobile is dangerous beyond the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, it may be relevant to consider the consumer's expectations
regarding the dealer's performance as well.
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gerous because they fail to perform in the manner reasonably to be
expected in light of their nature and intended function."" Hence the
''unreasonably dangerous" standard would have helped to minimize
any burden incident to imposition of strict liability uponused car
dealers. The California Supreme Court signaled agreement with this
conclusion when it declared that the "unreasonably dangerous" rule
may "serve the beneficial purpose of preventing the seller from
being treated as the insurer of its products."'0 This purpose was the
focus of the supreme court's concern in Peterson, but the court
failed to attribute to the "unreasonably dangerous" standard the
critical importance it deserved. Should the court come to re-assess
its position, it will likely be influenced by this factor.
BYSTANDER RECOVERY IN STRICT LIABILITY

One of the two issues presented in Peterson was whether a bystander'0 ' may sue on the basis of strict liability. The appellate court
answered the question in the affirmative, joining two other Illinois
courts 10 2 and the weight of authority throughout the nation. The
Illinois Supreme Court subsequently handed down its decision in
Winnett v. Winnett,103 seemingly resolving the issue in favor of the
bystander. However, the supreme court's reversal in Peterson managed to cloud the otherwise clear holding of Winnett, leaving the
bystander in something of a legal limbo.
In Peterson, the appellate court took cognizance of the fact that
the "more enlightened approach" was in favor of permitting bystander recovery.' 0 ' The court found persuasive the reasoning of the
99. 42 Ill. 2d at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403 (emphasis added). Significantly, the court related
that the hammer at issue had a propensity to chip, so that while a new hammer would be
expected to perform effectively, at some point the possibility of chipping would become a
reasonable expectation, thus part of the hammer's "likely performance." Id. at 343, 247
N.E.2d at 403. The court quoted Justice Traynor to illustrate that problems arise in the
middle range, declaring that these problems present questions for the jury. Id. at 343-44, 247
N.E.2d at 403. It is submitted that a used car sale offers a prime example of the middle range
problem alluded to by the court. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
100. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972). See Wade, Recent Developments in the Law of Strict Liability for Products,
33 INS. COUN. J. 552, 554 (1966).
101. A bystander is a person who is neither a user nor a consumer of the product in
question. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment 1 (1965), for a description
of some of the characteristics of users and consumers.
102. Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972) (dictum), rev'd on other
grounds, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973); White v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc., 326 F. Supp.
751 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
103. 57 Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
104. 17 Ill. App. 3d at 697-98, 307 N.E.2d at 734.
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California Supreme Court in Elmore v. American Motors Co.,"'
quoting from that decision as follows:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection
than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the
defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers and users, at least,
have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and
sold by reputable retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has
no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is in greater need of
protection from defective products which are dangerous, and if any
distinction should be made between bystanders and users, it
should be made

.

. .

to extend greater liability in favor of the

bystanders.1N
Agreeing with the California court's "cogent reasoning," the appellate court held that a bystander could bring an action based upon
strict liability in tort.
Approximately one week after the denial of rehearing in Peterson,
the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its decision in Winnett.'0
As previously discussed,1°s Winnett was a strict liability action involving a child who had suffered injury when she placed her hand
on a moving conveyor belt. Commenting that the plaintiff was neither a "user" nor a "consumer" of the product, the court expressed
its dissatisfaction with such labels as yardsticks for measuring the
right of recovery in strict liability. The court substituted an objective foreseeability test and concluded:
Whether the plaintiff here is an individual who is entitled to the
protections afforded by the concepts of strict tort liability depends
upon whether it can be fairly said that her conduct in placing her
fingers in the moving screen or belt of the forage wagon was reasonably foreseeable."
Finding that the plaintiff did not qualify under this standard, the
court reinstated the trial court's dismissal of her complaint.
Winnett clearly established that bystanders may sue on the basis
105. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
106. 17 111. App. 3d at 698, 307 N.E.2d at 734, citing 70 Cal. 2d at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. at 657. Another major reason for allowing bystander recovery is the fact that denial
would amount to a "resurrecting" of the privity rule. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14.
107. In Peterson, the appellate court denied rehearing on March 22, 1974. On March 29
of that year, the supreme court handed down its decision in Winnett.
108. See notes 67 through 71 supra and accompanying text.
109. 57 Ill. 2d at 12, 310 N.E.2d at 4. The court defined "foreseeable" as that which is
"objectively reasonable to expect." Id. at 12, 310 N.E.2d at 5. For further discussion of the
court's foreseeability test, see notes 69 through 71 supra and accompanying text.
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of strict liability. By terming the plaintiff neither a user nor a consumer of the product, making her by definition a bystander, and
then predicating her right of recovery upon a foreseeability test, the
court unmistakably indicated that bystanders may bring strict liability actions."10
In light of the foregoing, the supreme court's treatment of the
question in Peterson is rather cryptic. The court stated:
Two issues are presented on this appeal: first, whether as a matter
of law, strict liability extends to the seller of a used car and, second, whether a bystander who has been struck by a defective and
unreasonably dangerous car may sue under a theory of strict liability. Our disposition of the first of these issues makes it unnecessary
to consider the second. I'
If the court meant only to restrict its discussion to the first issue,
and nothing more," 2 then it chose a particularly inartful way of
expressing its purpose. If the court intended to intimate that bystander recovery is yet a "live" issue, Winnett notwithstanding,
then the court was successful. In either event, it will take a future
110. See Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 23 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 320 N.E.2d 412 (1974).
However, the bystander's recovery is subject to the defenses available in any strict liability
action: assumption of risk and misuse. For a discussion of the former, see note 93 supra.
Misuse occurs when a product is used "for a purpose neither intended nor 'foreseeable'
(objectively reasonable) by the defendant." Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d at 425,
261 N.E.2d at 309. The exact parameters of the misuse defense, never clear, are less so after
Winnett. In Williams, the court stated that the defendant could assert misuse to refute the
plaintiff's allegations as to proximate cause and unreasonably dangerous condition. 45 Ill. 2d
at 431, 261 N.E.2d at 312. While characterizing assumption of risk as an affirmative defense
which bars recovery, the court referred to misuse merely as conduct which may bar recovery.
Thus the Williams court seemingly did not envision misuse as a complete defense, if indeed
it could be properly termed a defense at all. Subsequent courts have labeled misuse a defense
without delineating its scope. Charleston Nat. Bank v. International Harvester Co., 22 Ill.
App. 3d 999, 317 N.E.2d 585 (1974); McKasson v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 12 111.App. 3d 429, 299
N.E.2d 38 (1973). Winnett can be broadly read to establish misuse as a complete defense,
available irrespective of the issue of causation. See text accompanying note 69 supra. Such a
rule would produce harsh results, especially in cases involving innocent bystanders and third
party misusers. In any event, it is clear that misuse will bar recovery where it served as the
sole cause of the injury, even if the misuse is that of a third party. Burke v. Sky Climber,
Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974). Undoubtedly the same would be true where the
misuse constituted an intervening cause, as it apparently did in Winnett. Ozmon, supra note
16, at 911-12. See generally Comment, Misuse As a Bar to Bystander Recovery Under Strict
Products Liability, 10 HOUST. L. RPv. 1106 (1973).
111. 61 Ill. 2d at 19, 329 N.E.2d at 786.
112. This is the interpretation of the counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr. Eugene Brassfield, who
wrote to this writer:
The failure of the Court to comment on the bystander issue is only interpreted by
me to mean that the bystander question had been resolved in Winnett v. Winnett,
and the Court found it unnecessary to comment further on that question.
Letter from Mr. Eugene E. Brassfield to Brian A. Forgue, September 4, 1975.
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pronouncement of the supreme court to lay the matter to rest. In
the meantime, Winnett and its antecedents remain law.
AFTER PETERSON-A LOOK AHEAD

In the final analysis, the Peterson decision may prove to be more
important for what it did not decide than for what it actually did
decide. In reaching the merits of the case, the court expounded,
however obliquely, a philosophy of strict liability which could have
widespread and lasting significance, not only in terms of strict liability actions against used car dealers, but also in the areas of indemnity, lessor liability, breach of warranty actions, and Suvada
pleading requirements.
The Strict Liability Of Used Car Dealers
The supreme court in Peterson did not totally exclude the possibility of strict liability actions against used car dealers. Distinguishing the instant case from those situations where the defect had been
created by the manufacturer or dealer, the court declined to impose
liability "upon the facts alleged here."'' To have done so would
have made the dealer an insurer against consumer-created defects.
The court implied that, had the defects originated with the manufacturer, it would have recognized liability, for then the dealer
would be in a position analogous to that of a wholesaler or retailer
who may recoup his loss through indemnity. Similarly, the court
intimated that its decision might have been different had the dealer
created the defects in question,"' a view wholly consistent with the
court's philosophy of imposing the ultimate burden of loss upon the
party responsible for the creation of the defect."'
Furthermore, the court retained the option of re-assessing its
judgment at a later time. After admitting that perhaps a heavy
responsibility should be placed upon used car dealers to ensure the
113. 61 IRI.2d at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
114. This inference is strengthened by the court's citation of Realmuto v. Straub Motors,
Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974), where the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that
the strict liability doctrine should be extended to used car dealers where injuries result from
work done on the automobile by the dealer prior to sale.
115. This result, however, might frustrate the policy objectives of the strict liability doctrine. If a dealer will be held strictly liable for injuries caused by dealer-created defects, he
may be discouraged from undertaking restorative or repair work. It seems unwise to limit the
dealer's liability to negligence where he does nothing to the automobile prior to sale, but yet
to penalize the more conscientious dealer by imposing strict liability for injuries resulting
from the dealer's work on the automobile, regardless of the amount of care the dealer may
have exercised in the process. It may be better to maintain the status quo, rather than to
recognize strict liability but restrict its scope in this manner.
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safety of the cars they sell, the court nonetheless noted that it was
aware of no decisions which had so held. It may well be that the
court will be led to a re-appraisal of its holding, should that holding
eventually come to represent a minority viewpoint, as this writer
believes it will.
Indemnity And The Control Requirement
Peterson gives the first express confirmation by the Illinois Supreme Court of the right of wholesalers and retailers to indemnification.' 6 Since this right has never been seriously challenged, what is
noteworthy in this connection is not the fact that the court recognized the right of indemnity, but how it phrased that recognition:
"A wholesaler or retailer who neither creates nor assumes the risk
is entitled to indemnity. '
Drawing inferences from dicta is a hazardous undertaking, especially in the case of dictum so fragmentary, but it appears that the
court was attempting to suggest the parameters of the right of indemnity. Insofar as the court emphasized that the loss resulting
from defective products should be imposed upon, and ultimately
borne by, the party creating the risk, the court must have been
equating risk creation with the creation of the defect itself.',8 Therefore, a wholesaler or retailer who has himself created the defect or
who has assumed the risk"' of its existence will be barred from
indemnity; otherwise, indemnity is an entitlement which even negligence will not destroy.' 0
116. For further discussion, see notes 61 through 65 supra and accompanying text. It is
unclear whether the defendant in an indemnity action brought by a party in the distributive
chain must be the actual creator of the defect, or merely a predecessor in the chain. Language
in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Employers Mutual Ins. Co. of Wis., 6 Ill. App. 3d 10, 284 N.E.2d
386 (1972) suggests the former, but a review of the facts in the case indicates that the court's
comments were dicta. Peterson envisions indemnity as a device whereby losses are passed
through the chain to the creator of the defect. Thus indemnity is probably recoverable against
any party in the distributive chain. Note, Recent Developments in Tortleasor Contribution
in Illinois, 5 LOYOLA U. Cm. L.J. 496, 511 (1974). Nevertheless, the question remains open.
117. 61 IIl. 2d at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
118. This is the only meaningful way to refer to risk creation as a bar to an indemnity
suit brought by a wholesaler or retailer. Such parties can also be said to have created the
risk by merchandising the product, as the appellate court observed in Peterson. However, the
supreme court could not have intended this meaning, as every wholesaler and retailer creates
the risk in this sense. If risk creation precludes indemnity, and the broader concept of risk
creation were adopted, no wholesaler or retailer would be entitled to indemnity.
119. Since assumption of risk is a defense in a strict liability action, it is logical to allow
the defense in an indemnity suit based upon strict liability.
120. See Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351,254 N.E.2d 584 (1969),
where the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District declared that the Suvada decision
"manifests a strong public policy that insists upon the distribution of the economic burden
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The inference that a wholesaler or retailer who has created the
defect will be denied indemnity, as well as the suggestion that
dealer-created defects may give rise to strict liability, also support
another conclusion: the plaintiff in a strict liability action need not
trace the alleged defect to the time the product left the manufacturer's control. Strangely, the demands of the control requirement
have never been settled. The better reasoned view, supported by
some case authority, 2' and now strengthened by Peterson, is that
the defect need only be traced back to the particular defendant
being sued.

22

Until the issue is squarely resolved, however, the

courts will probably continue to follow the Suvada language and
require the pleadings to trace the defect back to the time the prod' 123
uct "left the manufacturer's control.'

in the most socially desirable manner, even to the extent of ignoring the indemnitee's fault."
Id. at 358, 254 N.E.2d at 588. For further discussion of Texaco, see notes 62-63 supra and
accompanying text.
121. In Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d
64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970), the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District did not require a
tracing to the manufacturer. In Sweeney, the plaintiff had bought some nails from the defendant, a hardware and building supply merchant. As the plaintiff was hammering one of the
nails the head flew off and struck the plaintiff in the eye, blinding him. Suit was brought
against the merchant, and judgment was rendered in the plaintiff's favor. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed, holding that "[b]efore a consumer can recover from a retailer he
must prove that . . . the defect was in the product when it was sold by the retailer....
Id. at 14, 236 N.E.2d at 442-43 (emphasis added). The court concluded that the plaintiff had
met the control requirement because it was undisputed that the defect, if there was one, was

in existence at the time the nail was sold.
A similar result was reached by the Illinois Supreme Court in Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hospital, 47 111.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). In Cunningham, the plaintiff sued
the hospital after contracting serum hepatitis following a transfusion of blood. The hospital
had obtained the blood from the Michael Reese Hospital Blood Bank. The plaintiff alleged
that the blood had been in an unreasonably dangerous condition at the time of the transfusion. However, there was no allegation that this condition was present when the blood left
the blood bank. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the plaintiff's
complaint stated a cause of action in strict liability, going so far as to declare that the plaintiff
had met "[aill of the requirements set forth in Suvada." Id. at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
In Sweeney, the defendant made a general allegation that the plaintiff had not met the
Suvada requirements without singling out the control requirement. Nevertheless, the court
examined the control requirement and found that the plaintiff had satisfied it. Likewise, in
Cunningham the control requirement was not expressly at issue, but the court did find that
the plaintiff had fulfilled all of Suvada's dictates. Therefore, while neither decision squarely
confronted the issue, both support the view that the control requirement demands a tracing
only to the particular defendant being sued.
122. McNulty, Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: The Third Party
Beneficiary of WarrantiesIs Alive and Well and Living in Illinois, 51 Cm. B. REc. 339, 344
(1970). Ozmon, supra note 16, at 913-15. Accord, Wade, supra note 11, at 20-21; Fall of the
Citadel, supra note 11, at 841.
123. 32 III. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
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Lessor Liability Under The Strict Liability Doctrine
While the Peterson holding is limited to used car dealer actions,
the reasoning which produced it may lead to a re-thinking of the
strict liability doctrine's application to lessors.
In Galluccio v. Hertz Corp.,124 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fifth District extended the strict liability doctrine to the lessor of a
motor vehicle. In so doing, the court borrowed heavily from the New
Jersey decision of Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Service.'2 The Cintrone court, whose reasoning the appellate court
deemed "compelling," had relied upon all three of the traditional
strict liability policy justifications. The appellate court gave special
emphasis to one argument advanced by the New Jersey court:
The operator of the rental business must be regarded as possessing
expertise with respect to the service life and fitness of his vehicles
for use. That expertise ought to put him in a better position than
the bailee to detect or to anticipate flaws or defects or fatigue in
his vehicles. 2 '
Commenting that the "logic and rationale" of the Suvada decision
supported its conclusion, the court held that the plaintiffs' complaint against the defendant lessor stated a cause of action in strict
liability.
The Galluccio holding seems incompatible with the philosophy
articulated by the supreme court in Peterson. The Peterson court
refused to extend strict liability to used car dealers in the case of
consumer-created defects. Since the plaintiffs in Galluccio apparently did not allege that the defective brakes in question there were
the fault of the manufacturer, Galluccio allows recovery in precisely
the same circumstance where Peterson would not. It appears incongruous to mandate lessor liability upon public policy grounds while
refusing used car dealer liability in the same instance.
Cases involving used car dealers and automobile lessors are distinguishable. The lessor is in a better position to monitor the condition of his vehicles, since he can periodically inspect and/or replace
them, thus diminishing the possibility of injury. Also, the traveling
public has higher expectations regarding the quality of automobiles
obtained from lessors, especially when compared to situations where
automobiles are purchased from dealers "as is." Nonetheless, the
spirit of Galluccio seems more consistent with the appellate court's
124.
125.
126.

1 M1.App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971).
45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
1 111. App. 3d at 278, 274 N.E.2d at 182, citing 45 N.J. at 450-51, 212 A.2d at 778.
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decision in Peterson.'1 Both cases featured recognition of strict liability in the event of consumer-created defects upon public policy
grounds.
Until the supreme court has an opportunity to comment upon the
relationship of Galluccio and Peterson, the former will remain uncertain precedent. A proper interpretation of Peterson suggests that
the scope of Galluccio should be circumscribed.
The Implied Warranty Of Merchantability
A collateral effect of Peterson which remains to be surveyed is the
impact of the decision upon the right to bring a suit against a used
car dealer based upon breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Although not at issue in Peterson, this right is foreclosed by
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Peterson decision.
The central thrust of Peterson is that used car dealers should not
be made insurers of the products they sell. However, this is exactly
what the implied warranty of merchantability accomplishes. The
Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Unless excluded or modified . . . a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.'1
The Code section, in pertinent part, goes on to define merchantability: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . . (c)
'12 9
are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
Since the warranty is based exclusively upon the condition of the
product, irrespective of the dealer's efforts, the statute in effect
creates a variant form of strict liability, a fact recognized by the
supreme court in Suvada.M Therefore, it would seem anomalous to
127. In Peterson, the appellate court noted that its holding had been "further strengthened" by Galluccio. 17 Ill.
App. 3d at 696, 307 N.E.2d at 733. Moreover, in his dissent, Mr.
Justice Goldenhersh stated that he could see no reason for not applying the Galluccio rationale to the Peterson case. 61 Ill.
2d at 23, 329 N.E.2d at 788. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LiABiLrrv § 16A[4][b][iv], at 3-282 (1974).
128. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-314(1) (1973).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-314(2)(c) (1973). Actually, the warranty may place an even
greater burden upon the seller than would result from imposition of strict liability. A plaintiff
seeking to recover on a strict liability theory will be successful only if he proves that the
product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous. In contrast, a plaintiff suing on the
basis of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability need only show that the product
is unfit for the ordinary purposes for which that type of product is used. Cf. Ozmon, supra
note 16, at 915.
130. In Suvada, the supreme court used the terms "implied warranty" and "strict liability" interchangeably. 32 Ill. 2d at 617, 210 N.E.2d at 185. See discussion of the Wiedeman
case at note 55 supra.
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impose strict liability upon dealers by way of implied warranty,
while forbidding a strict liability action sounding in tort.
It is not enough to contend that the dealer may escape warranty
liability through a disclaimer.' 3' The disclaimer may have a counterpart in strict liability,'32 but the supreme court did not consider the
question in Peterson, nor did it examine the alternative means by
which the dealer could shift the burden incident to liability. The
rationale of Peterson is that dealers should not be forced to become
insurers against all defects. Presumably, the possibility of disclaimer would not justify the otherwise impermissible recognition of
liability.
The applicability of the implied warranty of merchantability to
used car dealers is currently unresolved.' 31 Peterson suggests that
the warranty should not be recognized, at least upon the facts of
34
that case, and probably in other dealer situations as well.'
131. The availability of the warranty disclaimer is under increasing attack. See discussion
in note 32 supra. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires the Federal Trade Commission
to conduct a rulemaking proceeding dealing with warranty practices involved in the sale of
used motor vehicles and prescribe any rules necessary to "supplement the protections offered
the consumer" by the Act. In so doing, the Commission may exercise any statutory authority
it may have and, in addition, may "require disclosure that a used motor vehicle is sold
without any warranty and specify the form and content of such disclosure." 15 U.S.C. §
2309(b) (1975). An investigation is currently under way to determine whether such rules are
needed. Letter from Mr. Bernard J. Phillips, Attorney, Division of Marketing Practices,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, June 20, 1975. It should be noted
that implied warranties may be excluded by means other than express disclaimers. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-316(3)(b)(c) (1973).
132. See discussion in note 91 supra.
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 3 states that a contract for the sale of
secondhand goods involves "only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods." Applying
the language of the comment, the Appellate Court for the First District found that an "appropriate" implied warranty of merchantability had been created by a seller who represented
the automobile in question as being in good condition. Overland Bond and Inv. Corp. v.
Howard, 9 IIl. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972). The court recognized an implied warranty
of merchantability, but it is unclear whether the court would have done so had the seller not
made the foregoing representation. Overland is important, nonetheless, because it offers an
excellent review of the warranty provisions of the Code, especially as they relate to automobile
sales. Also, consider the language of the statute: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as . . . (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 26, § 2-314(2)(c) (1973) (emphasis added). Since the statute prescribes a minimum
standard, without distinction as to types of goods, it would appear to prohibit the recognition
of a lesser warranty for used automobiles. See generally Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (1967) (automobile was sold "as is," but the court
discussed whether the warranty applies to used automobiles).
134. Other warranties, however, may arise in connection with the sale of a used automobile: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-313 (1973) (express warranty); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-315
(1973) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose); see note 59 supra for discussion
of warranty contained in Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.
It may also be possible to bring suit based upon a breach by the dealer of his obligation of
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CONCLUSION

The supreme court may be ultimately correct in its determination
that the extension of liability sought by the plaintiffs in Peterson
was unwise.' 35 However, had the court given proper weight to the
''unreasonably dangerous" standard as a limitation upon liability,
it might have concluded that an affirmance of the appellate court's
judgment would have been both desirable and not unduly burdensome to used car dealers.
Moreover, even if the court proves to be right in its ultimate
determination, the fact remains that the court failed to address the
policy arguments surrounding the issue, producing an unsatisfactory opinion. The Peterson decision raised more questions than it
answered. It will be up to later courts to decide whether Peterson
should be distinguished upon its facts or given wider scope. In the
meantime, the Peterson decision merits careful study as a present
expression of the supreme court's thinking and a useful gauge of the
future direction of products liability law in Illinois.
BRIAN

A. FORGUE

good faith. There is an obligation of good faith imposed upon the performance or enforcement
of every contract or duty within the Commercial Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 1-203 (1973).
Furthermore, this obligation is enforceable by action. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 1-106(2) (1973).
Good faith in the context of a used car sale means "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2103(1)(b) (1973). And unlike warranties, this obligation cannot be disclaimed, although "the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 26, § 1-102(3) (1973).
135. The defendant in Peterson may still be held liable on a negligence theory. See note
82 supra and accompanying text. After the case was remanded by the supreme court, the
plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a negligence count, to which the defendant has
filed an answer. Letter from Mr. Eugene E. Brassfield, September 4, 1975. The plaintiffs are
also suing the owners and driver of the automobile involved in the accident. Peterson v. Lou
Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d at 19, 329 N.E.2d at 786.

